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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLEE BRIEF 
Case No. 2.0020606-CA 
APPELLEE BRIEF 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is not proper pursuant to Rule 4 et. seq. of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, in that this is an attempted late appeal from 
a decree that was not objected to, and the Court of Appeals lacks 
jurisdiction therefore.. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the Respondent barred by the statute of limitations for not 
objecting in a timely manner to the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Decree of Divorce? 
2. Did the Respondent appeal the Decree of Divorce before the 30 
day limit passed. 
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3. Are post-judgment motions ripe for adjudication in the appellate ' 
court when not having been formally appealed? j 
4. In the alternative, if this matter was timely appealed, and not ( 
barred for failure to object to the decree, did the district court judge abuse J 
his discretion with respect to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 4 
decree of divorce; and/or is the decree of divorce ambiguous. i 
STANDARD OF REVIEW J 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "Trial courts are given * 
primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact i 
are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard. J 
For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual | 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the I 
record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to J 
the trial court's determination." State of Utah v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 ( 
(1994). I 
The appellate court's standard of review with regard to issues of law J 
are, "that all applications of law to findings of fact that produce conclusions | 
of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, i.e., for correctness." € 
State v. Ramirezr 817 P.2d 774r 781-82 (Utah 1991). J 
5 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
§30-3-7- of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk 
in the register of actions... 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may 
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceeding for review are 
pending; or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for 
sufficient cause otherwise orders. 
Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) 
hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by 
the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and 
judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for 
all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same 
is signed and filed as herein provided. The clerk shall immediately make a 
notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. A copy of the signed 
judgment shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner 
provided in Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by 
the requirement of this provision. 
6 
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Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after he entry of the judgment 
Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own 
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions 
of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the requirements or 
provisions of any of these rules in a particular case and may order 
proceedings in that case in accordance with its direction. 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an 
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate 
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of 
the trial court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from... 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for 
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make 
additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment 
would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or 
amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for 
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new 
trial or granting or denying any other such motion.... A notice of appeal 
7 
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filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no 
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order ol the trial court disposing of the 
motion as provided above. 
Rule 4-504 (2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be 
served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for 
su at« »re unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after service. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 he Cowl ot Appeals should dismiss this appeal due to the 
Respondent's lack of objection to the proposed Decree of Divorce, an 
untimely appeal, untimely motions, and the lack of appeal on the 
post-appealed district court motions. In the alternative, the appeal should 
be denied because the Decree is not ambiguous and is based upon the 
agreement of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 4, 2002, a proposed Decree of Divorce in this matter was 
served by Petitioner's counsel via mail to the Respondent's counsel. (See 
Addendum A). The Respondent never filed an objection to the proposed 
Decree of Divorce. 
8 
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The district court judge signed the Decree of Divorce on June 18, 
2002. (See Addendum B). 
Thirty-one days later, on July 19, 2002, counsel for Respondent filed 
an untimely appeal of the Decree of Divorce. (See Addendum C). 
Following the untimely appeal of the Decree of Divorce, on or about 
November 3, 2003, the Respondent through counsel, filed a grossly 
untimely Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, which was 
subsequently denied. (See Addendum D). This ruling was never appealed. 
Following the untimely appeal of the Decree of Divorce, on or about 
July 19, 2002, the Respondent through counsel filed a timely Rule 60(a) 
and(b) motion to set aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree of Divorce, which was subsequently denied after oral argument on 
October 25, 2002. (See Addendum E). This ruling was never appealed. 
Respondent's appeal is on the grounds that the district court denied 
the Respondent's request for relief under Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Appellate Brief-page 1, Statement of the 
Case). 
On or about February 1, 2002, a Pre-trial Conference was held 
before Judge Bohling wherein a number of items were supposedly 
stipulated to between the parties, including: personal property, child 
support and alimony arrearages. (See Transcript of February 1, 2002 
Pre-trial Conference-pages 1 & 2). 
9 
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Many out of court discussions about this matter took place during 
February, 2002, and May, 2002, thereafter about the wording and actual 
agreements between the parties. The Respondent's counsel styled these 
discussions as "negotiating". (See Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing 
on Motion to Set Aside-pages 11 & 12). 
The trial court fully understood that the parties were in negotiations 
between the February 1, 2002 hearing, and June, 2002, and exchanged 
drafts. (See Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set 
Aside-page 24). 
Counsel for the Respondent admitted at the October 25, 2002 
hearing on Respondent's Motion to Set Aside that she and counsel for the 
Petitioner exchanged drafts of the Findings, Conclusions, and Decree. 
(Id.). 
Counsel for the Respondent admitted at the October 25, 2002 
hearing on Respondent's Motion to Set Aside receiving a final proposed 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, but stated 
that she thought that counsel for the Petitioner was going to hold the 
documents and not file them. (See Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing 
on Motion to Set Aside-pages 24 and 25). 
At the October 25, 2002, hearing on Respondent's Motion to Set 
Aside, and after a lengthy oral argument before Judge Bohling regarding 
what was and what was not stipulated to between the parties, the court 
stated that the parties had extensive dialogue and exchanges of 
10 
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documents and drafts after the previous stipulation, and that the court "has * 
no way of really knowing what the parties did in exchanging their < 
documents and drafts. What the court has to go on is what - was ( 
submitted to it and then, within the period of time, provided under the rules J 
to object, an objection." And the court concluded after reviewing all of the i 
evidence by holding that, "I think were looking at what would appear to be i 
changes made in the course of the negotiation that were reflected in the J 
final documents that were not acceptable." And the court denied g 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce. (See Transcript i 
of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-pages 36, 37 and ] 
38). | 
On or about June 21, 2002, a Notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce I 
was sent to counsel for Respondent. ( See Addendum F). The Respondent J 
never objected to the decree pursuant to Rule 4-504 (2) of the Utah Rules | 
of Judicial Administration. * 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS j 
I. The Respondent is barred by the statute of limitations for not | 
objecting in a timely manner to the proposed Findings of Fact, ' 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. * 
Rule 4-504 sets down the guidelines for decrees. The purposes for ( 
the guidelines were well articulated by Judge Bohling in this matter. (See ' 
Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-page 37). j 
Without a written objection the court can only assume that the | 
11 * 
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documents prepared and sent for signature are what the parties have 
agreed to, otherwise it opens the door in all cases for buyers remorse and 
a second bite of the apple. Without following Rule 4-504(2), and allowing 
for subsequent appeals, it takes the work of the trial court onto the 
appellate level. 
II. T h e Respondent 's appeal was untimely. 
The Respondent was served with the Findings of Facts, Conclusions 
of Law, and Decree of Divorce on June 4, 2002. The court waited a 
number of days to sign the documents, and executed them on June 18, 
2002. The Respondent never objected to documents, but on July 19, 2002, 
thirty one days later, filed an untimely appeal. 
The Respondent may rely upon §30-3-7 as to when the Decree 
becomes absolute, but for purposes of appeal, the statute of limitations 
begins to run on an order when it is signed and stamped by the judge or 
clerk, not when it goes into the registry. 
III. Post- judgment mot ions are not ripe for adjudication in the 
appellate court when not having been formally appealed from the trial 
court. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly outline the 
guidelines as to which post-judgment motions must be appealed, and 
which motions are granted a tolling of the statute of limitations for purposes 
of filing a subsequent appeal. 
12 
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{ 
( 
( 
( 
( 
Black-letter law throws out the 60(a) and (b) motions because they ] 
were never appealed. The Rule 59 motion is also thrown out because it 4 
was filed untimely to begin with. ( 
As such, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to even hear J 
these matters. 4 
IV. The district court judge did not abuse his discretion with ( 
respect to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of ; 
divorce; and the decree of divorce is not ambiguous. 4 
The district court judge signed the above-listed document fourteen i 
days after he received them. He could have signed them earlier. By
 g 
executing the documents, the court was only following the rules as | 
established by the State Supreme Court. i 
The documents signed by the court are not ambiguous. According to
 g 
the Respondent's counsel admissions, the February 1, 2002, stipulations { 
were debated between counsel for a number of months. When the I 
document were sent to the court for signature, Respondent's counsel had g 
a copy. Nothing was said or done by counsel for the respondent for | 
thirty-one days. The document is what it is, a proposed agreement i 
between the parties, and should speak for itself. It clearly outlines items * 
which are not ambiguous purporting to be the agreement between the ( 
parties. * 
13 • 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
I. The Respondent is barred by the statute of limitations for not 
objecting in a timely manner to the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. 
With regard to objecting to orders, judgments, and decrees, Rule 
4-504(2) specifically outlines the parties responsibilities, which are: 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented 
to the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. 
Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel 
within five days after service. 
Counsel for the Petitioner sent the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Decree of Divorce to Respondent's counsel on June 4, 2003, and 
sent the notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce to Respondent's counsel on 
June 21, 2002. The Respondent had five days after the first notice, but did 
not object to either notice, ever. 
The Utah Code outlines when a decree of divorce becomes absolute, 
it states: 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk 
in the register of actions... 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may 
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceeding for 
review are pending; or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for 
sufficient cause otherwise orders. §30-3-7(1) of the Utah Code 
Ann. 
14 
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The Respondent had ample time to object to the decree and chose 
not to. As per the statute, the decree became absolute on the day it was 
entered in the Register of actions which was June 20, 2002. 
The Respondent tried to set the decree aside citing differences 
between the documents and what was orally stated upon the record of the 
court on February 1, 2002. After lengthy oral argument, it became apparent 
to the Judge Bohling that the parties had numerous discussions and 
document exchanges between the February 1, 2002, pre-trial conference 
and when the documents were presented to the court for signature in June, 
2002. After a detailed analysis of the arguments of the parties, and after 
reviewing the February 1, 2002 oral stipulation, the court ruled that the 
parties made changes in the course of their negotiations, and that the 
motion to set aside the decree was based on "buyer's remorse". (See 
Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-pages 36, 
37 and 38). 
As such the court felt that the rules of the court should be followed 
and denied the motion to set aside and motion for new trial or to alter and 
amend decree. As Judge Bohling had to determine these facts after 
lengthy argument, and being apprised in the circumstances of the case, his 
facts should not be overturned unless he abused his discretion, which he 
did not. 
15 
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The court allowed the Respondent an opportunity to explain why the 
decree was not objected to in Respondent's Motion to Set Aside and 
Motion to Alter and Amend. The court denied these motions after a careful 
analysis. 
So, if the rule is there to make sure the court is not signing improper 
orders, and if an opportunity was presented to set the decree aside and 
explain why the order was not objected to, and was denied, the appellate 
court should not allow the rule to be broken. The Respondent should have 
objected to the decree within five days after service of the proposed 
documents, and did not, and this should present a bar to the Respondent 
to appeal, due to the appellate court's lack of jurisdiction. 
POINT II 
The Respondent's appeal was untimely. 
The trial court executed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and [Decree of Divorce on June 18, 2002. The Respondent never objected 
to the documents, but on July 19, 2002, thirty one days later, filed an 
untimely appeal. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly states: 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an 
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to 
the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after 
the entry of the judgment or order appealed from... 
16 
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Entry of judgment is explained as: 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision 
(a) hereof and Subdivision (bX1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall 
be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and 
judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real 
property, when the same is signed and filed as herein provided. 
The clerk shall immediately make a notation of the judgment in 
the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. A copy of the signed 
judgment shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in 
the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the requirement of this provision. 
Rule 58A (b)(c)&(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
We learn from the above rule that all judgments shall be signed by 
the judge and filed with the clerk. Except for a lien on real estate, the 
judgment is complete when the judge signs it and it is filed with the clerk, 
not when the clerk files it in the registry of actions. After the judgment is 
signed and filed with the clerk, the clerk files it in the registry of actions 
and the judgment docket. 
The Respondent may rely upon §30-3-7 as to when the Decree 
becomes absolute, but for purposes of appeal, the statute of limitations 
begins to run on an order when it is signed and stamped by the judge or 
clerk, not when it goes into the registry. 
As such, the appeal was untimely and the Court of Appeals lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the case. 
17 
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POINT III 
Post-judgment motions are not ripe for adjudication in the 
appellate court when not having been formally appealed from the trial 
court 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly states: 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any 
party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to 
amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is 
granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or 
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial 
or granting or denying any other such motion.... A notice of 
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions 
shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within 
the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the 
trial court disposing of the motion as provided above, 
outline the guidelines as to which post-judgment motions must 
be appealed, and which motions are granted a tolling of the 
statute of limitations for purposes of filing a subsequent appeal. 
Respondent's brief outlines that the appeal should be heard on Rule 
60 grounds, but the law clearly states that a failure to separately appeal the 
denial of a Rule 60 Motion will bar any action to it. The Respondent failed 
to appeal. 
Also, when the court denied the Rule 59 Motion, notwithstanding that 
the Motion was grossly untimely, the Respondent had 30 days from the 
date of denial to appeal. The Respondent failed to appeal. 
18 
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The rule has been reinforced by the Utah Supreme Court when they 
held: 
This court considered the proper time for appeal from a 
post-judgment motion in Hume v. Small Claims Court. 590 P.2d 
309 (Utah 1979). In Hume, we stated that a timely rule 59 
motion for a new trial suspends the time for appeal of a 
judgment and the "time for appeal does not begin to run again 
until the order granting or denying such a motion is entered." 
And, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)J requires a new 
notice of appeal to be filed after entry of an order disposing of a 
post-judgment motion. 
Swenson Associates Architects v. State of Utah, 889 P.2d 415, 
416-17(1994). 
As such, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction and 
should dismiss this matter. 
POINT IV 
The district court judge did not abuse his discretion with respect to 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce; and 
the Decree of Divorce is not ambiguous. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce; 
and the Decree of Divorce was entered into pursuant to stipulation and 
documents filed by Petitioner's counsel. There was much discussion 
between the parties during the time the original stipulation took place on 
February 1, 2002, and June 4, 2002. When there was no objection to 
documents filed by Petitioner's counsel, the district court executed the 
documents pursuant to Rule 4-504, hence no abuse of discretion. 
19 
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The Decree of Divorce is not ambiguous on it's face. It clearly states 
that at the time the documents were filed, that: 
Commencing February 1, 2002, Respondent is ordered to pay 
alimony to Petitioner which is calculated by finding the 
difference between $1250.00 per month and the monthly child 
support obligation, which alimony obligation is presently 
calculated to be $535.00 per month, for 25 years commencing 
on May 1,1998, and ending on April 30, 2023, unless sooner 
terminated based upon statutory bases or unless for good 
cause extended beyond that period by this Court. With respect 
to Respondent's alimony obligation, Respondent's income is 
subject to immediate and automatic withholding regardless of 
whether a delinquency exists. (See Addendum A, Decree of 
Divorce-page 4 
The decree clearly states that alimony is presently calculated at a 
certain figure which will change when the child support drops. There is 
nothing ambiguous about it. 
Counsel for the Respondent tried to argue that the agreement made 
on February 1, 2002, at the pre-trial conference refutes the language in the 
decree. The trial court judge questioned counsel for the Respondent by 
asking if, "the stipulation on the record was inaccurate because there were 
these other - this other deal was made otherwise?" Counsel for the 
Respondent answered, "No." (See Transcript of October 25, 2002, 
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-pages 34, and 35). 
Counsel for the Respondent then talked about other items not that 
the Respondent felt were not mentioned in the stipulation or decree, such 
20 
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as certain bills, debts, and in an earlier conversations some vehicles, (id.). 
After analyzing the facts, circumstances, and wording given in the 
February 1, 2002, pre-trial conference, and the wording in the executed 
decree of divorce, the court held that the Respondent's arguments 
amounted to "buyer's remorse", and that he didn't know what had 
transpired between the parties during February 2002, and June 2002. See 
Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-pages 37). 
Given the procedural remedies in place, the court felt that none of the 
elements of Rule 60 were satisfied, and the motion was dismissed. The 
Respondent should have appealed the October 25, 2002, ruling in order to 
keep that motion alive, but chose not to. 
The Respondent never did argue until their appellate brief, that the 
decree was vague or ambiguous. On the contrary, the Respondent cites as 
determinative law in their Docketing Statement Rule 60(a) and 
(b)(1)and(6), which is not part of this appeal. Even in the Respondent's 
Appellate Brief, they cite in their Statement of the Case that: 
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of Mr. 
Nigohosian's request, under Rules 59 and 60, URCP, to 
substitute an amended decree of divorce and supporting 
findings of fact and conclusions of law for those that had been 
entered which did not accurately reflect the parties' stipulated 
settlement as spread on the record several months earlier. 
(See Appellate Brief-pagel). 
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Using the Respondent's reasoning for the appeal, the Court of 
Appeals lacks jurisdiction because rule 59 and 60 were never appealed. 
The documents signed by the court are not ambiguous. According to 
the Respondent counsel's admissions, the February 1, 2002, stipulations 
were debated between counsel for a number of months. When the 
document were sent to the court for signature, Respondent's counsel had 
a copy. Nothing was said or done by counsel for the Respondent for 
thirty-one days. The document is what it is, a proposed agreement 
between the parties, and should speak for itself. It clearly outlines items 
which are not ambiguous purporting to be the agreement between the 
parties. 
As such, the decree should stand on it's own merit and be interpreted 
as alimony being presently the difference between child support and 
$1250.00, and changing to no more nor less than $1250.00 when the 
children become the age of majority or as Utah law provides. If the 
circumstances of the Respondent changes in the future he can always 
return to the court to have alimony adjusted. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly the Respondent never objected the findings of fat, 
conclusions of law, and decree of divorce. He also never appealed all of 
his post-judgment motions, also, the appeal should be barred due to the 
decree becoming absolute and/or the untimely appeal. Due to these 
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reasons, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter and 
should dismiss the appeal. 
In the alternative, the appeal is without grounds because the decree 
is not ambiguous, nor did the trial court judge abuse his discretion in 
signing the documents due to the lack of an objection, and the Respondent 
has not properly marshaled the evidence. 
The Petitioner/Appellee respectfully requests that the Respondents 
appeal be dismissed, and that she be granted her attorney's fees and 
costs in this matter given the late appeal, no objection, and untimely rule 
59 motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .1o day of December, 2003. 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
s/yln^
 ; 
Kessler, Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ 'ff clay of December, 2003,1 
hand-delivered or sent via First Class United States Mail two copies of the 
foregoing Appellee Brief to the following: 
Douglas G. Mortensen, Esq. 
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 „ ' 
Jay L. Kessler 
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ADDENDUM 
CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM 
A. Petitioner's proposed Decree of Divorce with Certificate of mailing dated 
June 4, 2002. 
B. The parties' Decree of Divorce signed on June 18, 2002, by Judge 
Bohling. 
C. Respondent's Notice of Appeal filed on July 19, 2002. 
D. Respondent's untimely Rule 59 Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment filed 
on or about November 2, 2002. 
E. Respondent's Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, filed July 19, 2002. 
F. Petitioner's Notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce sent to Respondent on 
June 21, 2002. 
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IMAGED 
JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196 
McINTYRE & GOLDEN. L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
3838 South West Temple, Suite 3 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 266-3399 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OFjJUDGMEJN 
^ 
FILED 0(STR!CT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
3y. 
?::i i 9 2002 
SALTUKCcppNTY 
*_L2, 
Deputy cietk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN. 
Petitioner. 
vs. 
ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 974904859DA 
Honorable William B. Bohling 
Commissioner Susan Bradford 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came on regularly for hearing at a Pre-Trial 
conference held before the Honorable William B. Bohling at 9:00 a.m. on February 1. 2002. 
Petitioner. Margaret Nigohosian, was present and represented by counsel, James A. Mclntyre, of and 
for Mclntyre & Golden. L.C. Respondent. Robert Nigohosian. was present and represented by 
counsel. Ellen M. O'Hara. The parties met and conferred thereafter with the Court and between 
themselves until 3:15 p.m. during which time periodic stipulations were read into the record until 
a final and complete settlement was reached and read into the record. Based upon the stipulations 
of the parties, the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Decree of Divorce Pase I of 7 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. The bonds of matrimony and marriage contract between the Parties are dissolved, and 
Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Respondent, to become finai upon entry by the 
Court. 
2. The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the parties' minor children. Philip 
Nigohosian. born February 23, 1985; and Randall Nigohosian, born June 12, 1987. Petitioner is 
awarded the primary physical custody of the children. 
3. Respondent is awarded reasonable visitation as provided in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
35. Further. Respondent is awarded expanded visitation from following school on Tuesdays until 
Thursday morning provided that he provide all transportation to and from the children's residence 
to his residence in Park City, Utah and returning them to school on Thursday morning. This 
extended period of visitation should also take place during the summer months. 
4. The issue concerning the children being left alone for extended periods of time while 
Respondent works during the "extended periods of time" described above from Tuesday through 
Thursday is reserved for future determination. 
5. The parties are ordered to abide by the provisions contained in Utah Code Ann. §§30-
3-32 thru 30-3-37 (2001). Further, generally the children shall be picked up at Petitioner's residence 
unless other arrangements are made for the convenience of the parties or the children. 
6. The State of Utah is the resident state of the children. 
7. In the event one party moves to another state, then the party that moved is ordered to 
pay for the costs of transporting the children for visitation purposes. 
8. Petitioner and Respondent are ordered to exchange information concerning the health. 
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( I 
education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning 
any of these areas. 
9. Petitioner is awarded the parties* marital home located at 7026 Sunburst Circle. Salt 
Lake County*. Utah 84121. and its equity as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any 
claim by Respondent. Petitioner is ordered to be responsible for the mortgage, property taxes or 
other encumbrances owing thereon. Respondent is ordered to execute a deed in Petitioner's favor. 
10. Petitioner is ordered to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence in her own 
name and remove Respondent's name from the mortgage no later than the youngest child's attaining 
the age of 18. 
11. Each party is awarded the personal property presently in their possession. 
12. Respondent is entitled to claim Philip as a dependant for tax purposes and Petitioner 
is entitled to claim Randall as a dependent for tax purposes. Respondent's entitlement to claim 
Philip is specifically conditioned upon his being current on his child support and alimony obligations 
during the calendar year from which the exemption is claimed. 
13. Petitioner is awarded one-half of Respondent's retirement account which amount 
should be calculated according to the formula established in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982). This Court shall issue the appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order securing 
Petitioner's interest in said retirement plan. 
14. Petitioner is ordered to pay directly to Respondent the sum of $500.00 to equalize the 
apportionment of debt and Respondent shall thereafter be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless from 
any claimed indebtedness owed to Fleet Bank of Boston, Sears. Salt Lake Credit Union. Capital One 
Visa or his mother. 
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15. Commencing February 1. 2002. Respondent is ordered to pay to Petitioner the sum 
of $715.00 per month as and for child support for the parties' minor children. Further. Respondent 
is entitled to deduct one-half of the parties" minor children's portion of the monthly health insurance 
premium deducted from Respondent's paycheck. Child support shall be paid for each child until the 
child turns 18 years of age or graduates from high school during the normal course of his education 
and with his normal graduating class, whichever occurs later. With respect to Respondents child 
support obligation. Respondent's income is subject to immediate and automatic income withholding 
regardless of whether a delinquency exists as is set forth below. 
16. Commencing February 1
 ? 2002, Respondent is ordered to pay alimony to Petitioner 
which is calculated by finding the difference between $1,250.00 per month and the monthly child 
support obligation, which alimony obligation is presently calculated to be $535.00 per month, for 
25 years commencing on May 1,1998, and ending on April 30,2023, unless sooner terminated based 
upon statutory bases or unless for good cause extended beyond that period by this Court. With 
respect to Respondent's alimony obligation. Respondent's income is subject to immediate and 
automatic income withholding regardless of whether a delinquency exists. 
17. With respect to Respondent's child support and alimony obligation. 
Respondent's income is subject to immediate and automatic income withholding as of the effective 
date of the order, regardless of whether a delinquency exists. 
a) Each party is ordered to keep the Office of Recovery Service informed of 
changes in their address, employment, income, or medical insurance coverage. 
b) Pursuant to Utah Code .Ann. Sec. 62A-11-320.5. each party to this action may 
request that the Office of Recovery Services review the Court's child support order for this 
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action to determine whether a modification of the Court ordered child support be pursued. 
18. Respondent is ordered to maintain his present life insurance policy and is ordered to 
name Petitioner as the beneficiary so long as she is owed child support or alimony. 
19. Petitioner presently owns a policy of life insurance on Respondent's life which she 
intends to maintain for so long as she is owed alimony. Petitioner is entitled to maintain that policy 
of life insurance upon Respondent's life and Respondent is ordered to cooperate in a physical 
examination on or before April 1. 2002. 
20. Respondent is entitled to file amended joint income tax returns for the years 1999 and 
2000 at his sole cost and expense and Petitioner is ordered to cooperate in the filing of said returns 
with the provision that any refund is ordered to be applied as follows: 1) First, to the payment of 
Respondent's share of the children's braces; and 2) Second, any remainder should be applied to child 
support, first past due support and then future support. 
21. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 (1996) Respondent is ordered to maintain 
medical insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children. Petitioner and Respondent are 
ordered to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by Respondent for the 
children's portion of the insurance.1 Each party is ordered to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses (including braces for Randall if necessary and vision 
expenses), including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the parties* minor children. 
Respondent is ordered to provide verification of the coverage to Petitioner and to the Office of 
'The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. 
The premium expense for die children should be calculated by dividing die premium amount by 
the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of 
children. 
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Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. section 601 et seq.. upon 
initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar 
year. Respondent is ordered to notify Petitioner and the Office of Recovery Services under IV of the 
Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or 
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known the change. 
A. A parent who incurs medical expenses is ordered to provide written 
verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days 
of payment. 
B. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit 
for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to 
comply with Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 (1996). 
22. Respondent is ordered to pay any outstanding debts incurred during the marriage. 
23. Both parties are ordered to execute any documents necessary to implement the Decree 
of Divorce. 
24. Petitioner is be restored toJiemiiaiden name "Marao Mary Coates." 
DATED this 1 h dav of m ^ ^ ,2002. 
tfSSBSSfflS 
LptftY COURT CLhHH 
I:\Clients\Nigohosian\Decree of DivorceS.wpd 
U U ^ 
: i
« ( ^ O R A B L E WILLIAM V M^LmG 
District Court Judge 
STATE OF UTAH 
&m:m of Salt Lake 
I, the un&&T8iant 
UtahsS?nUfc3Cf>: 
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JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196 
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
3838 South West Temple, Suite 3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 266-3399 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN, - • | DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, j 
vs. , J 
ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN, | * Civil No. 974904859DA 
Respondent. | Honorable William B. Bohling 
j Commissioner Susan Bradford 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came on regularly for hearing at a Pre-Trial 
conference held before the Honorable William B. Bohling at 9:00 a.m. on Februaiy 1, 2002. 
Petitioner, Margaret Nigohosian, was present and represented by counsel, James A. Mclntyre, of and 
for Mclntyre & Golden, L.C. Respondent, Robert Nigohosian, was present and represented by 
counsel, Ellen M. O'Hara. The parties met and conferred thereafter with the Court and between 
themselves until 3:15 p.m. during which time periodic stipulations were read into the record until 
a final and complete settlement was reached and read into the record. Based upon the stipulations 
of the parties, the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. The bonds of matrimony and marriage contract between the Parties are dissolved, and 
\ Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Respondent, to become final upon entry by the 
Court. 
2. The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the parties' minor children, Philip 
Nigohosian, born February 23, 1985; and Randall Nigohosian, bom June 12, 1987. Petitioner is 
awarded the primary physical custody of the children. 
3. Respondent is awarded reasonable visitation as provided in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
35. Further, Respondent is awarded expanded visitation from following school on Tuesdays until 
Thursday morning provided that he provide all transportation to and from the children's residence 
to his residence in Park City, Utah and returning them to school on Thursday morning. This 
extended period of visitation should also take place during the summer months. 
4. The issue concerning the children being left alone for extended periods of time while 
Respondent works during the "extended periods of time" described above from Tuesday through 
Thursday is reserved for future determination. 
5. The parties are ordered to abide by the provisions contained in Utah Code Ann. §§30-
3-32 thru 30-3-37 (2001). Further, generally the children shall be picked up at Petitioner's residence 
unless other arrangements are made for the convenience of the parties or the children. 
6. The State of Utah is the resident state of the children. 
7. In the event one party moves to another state, then the party that moved is ordered to 
pay for the costs of transporting the children for visitation purposes. 
8. Petitioner and Respondent are ordered to exchange information concerning the health, 
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education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning 
any of these areas. 
9. Petitioner is awarded the parties' marital home located at 7026 Sunburst Circle, Salt 
Lake County, Utah 84121, and its equity as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any 
claim by Respondent. Petitioner is ordered to be responsible for the mortgage, property taxes or 
other encumbrances owing thereon. Respondent is ordered to execute a deed in Petitioner's favor. 
10. Petitioner is ordered to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence in her own 
name and remove Respondent's name from the mortgage no later than the youngest child's attaining 
the age of 18. 
11. Each party is awarded the personal property presently in their possession. 
12. Respondent is entitled to claim Philip as a dependant for tax purposes and Petitioner 
is entitled to claim Randall as a dependent for tax purposes. Respondent's entitlement to claim 
Philip is specifically conditioned upon his being current on his child support and alimony obligations 
during the calendar year from which the exemption is claimed. 
13. Petitioner is awarded one-half of Respondent's retirement account which amount 
should be calculated according to the formula established in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982). This Court shall issue the appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order securing 
Petitioner's interest in said retirement plan. 
14. Petitioner is ordered to pay directly to Respondent the sum of $500.00 to equalize the 
apportionment of debt and Respondent shall thereafter be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless from 
any claimed indebtedness owed to Fleet Bank of Boston, Sears, Salt Lake Credit Union, Capital One 
Visa or his mother. 
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15. Commencing February 1,2002, Respondent is ordered to pay to Petitioner the sum 
of $715.00 per month as and for child support for the parties' minor children. Further, Respondent 
is entitled to deduct one-half of the parties' minor children's portion of the monthly health insurance 
premium deducted from Respondent's paycheck. Child support shall be paid for each child until the 
child turns 18 years of age or graduates from high school during the normal course of his education 
and with his normal graduating class, whichever occurs later. With respect to Respondent's child 
support obligation, Respondent's income is subject to immediate and automatic income withholding 
regardless of whether a delinquency exists as is set forth below. 
16. Commencing February 1, 2002, Respondent is ordered to pay alimony to Petitioner 
which is calculated by finding the difference between $1,250.00 per month and the monthly child 
support obligation, which alimony obligation is presently calculated to be $535.00 per month, for 
25 years commencing on May 1,1998, and ending on April 30,2023, unless sooner terminated based 
upon statutory bases or unless for good cause extended beyond that period by this Court. With 
respect to Respondent's alimony obligation, Respondent's income is subject to immediate and 
automatic income withholding regardless of whether a delinquency exists. 
17. With respect to Respondent's child support and alimony obligation, 
Respondent's income is subject to immediate and automatic income withholding as of the effective 
date of the order, regardless of whether a delinquency exists. 
a) Each party is ordered to keep the Office of Recovery Service informed of 
changes in their address, employment, income, or medical insurance coverage. 
b) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11 -320.5, each party to this action may 
request that the Office of Recovery Services review the Court's child support order for this 
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action to determine whether a modification of the Court ordered child support be pursued. 
18. Respondent is ordered to maintain his present life insurance policy and is ordered to 
name Petitioner as the beneficiary so long as she is owed child support or alimony. 
19. Petitioner presently owns a policy of life insurance on Respondent's life which she 
intends to maintain for so long as she is owed alimony. Petitioner is entitled to maintain that policy 
of life insurance upon Respondent's life and Respondent is ordered to cooperate in a physical 
examination on or before April 1,2002. 
20. Respondent is entitled to file amended joint income tax returns for the years 1999 and 
2000 at his sole cost and expense and Petitioner is ordered to cooperate in the filing of said returns 
with the provision that any refund is ordered to be applied as follows: 1) First, to the payment of 
Respondent's share of the children's braces; and 2) Second, any remainder should be applied to child 
support, first past due support and then future support. 
21. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 (1996) Respondent is ordered to maintain 
medical insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children. Petitioner and Respondent are 
ordered to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by Respondent for the 
children's portion of the insurance.1 Each party is ordered to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses (including braces for Randall if necessaiy and vision 
expenses), including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the parties' minor children. 
Respondent is ordered to provide verification of the coverage to Petitioner and to the Office of 
'The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. 
The premium expense for the children should be calculated by dividing the premium amount by 
the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of 
children. 
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Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 601 et seq., upon 
initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar 
year. Respondent is ordered to notify Petitioner and the Office of Recovery Services under IV of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or 
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known the change. 
A. A parent who incurs medical expenses is ordered to provide written 
verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days 
of payment. 
B, A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit 
for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to 
comply with Utah Code Ann. S78-45-7.15 (19961 
22. Respondent is ordered to pay any outstanding debts incurred during the marriage. 
23. Both parties are ordered to execute any documents necessary to implement the Decree 
of Divorce. 
24. Petitioner is be restored to her maiden name "Margo Mary Coates." 
DATED this day of ,2002. , 
BYTHECOURT: 
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following on this >^day of June, 2002. 
QcUAJiJilQmdJtMin^. 
Ellen M. O'Hara 
Attorney at Law 
211 East 300 South, Suite 215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2488 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this 19th day of July,2002 I placed in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to: t 
Margaret Nigohosian 
Petitioner 
7026 South Sunburst Cir. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
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Ellen M. O'Hara-7590 
Attorney for the Respondent 
211 East 300 South, Suite 215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-3968 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN, ) 
Respondent. 
RULE 59 MOTION TO ALTER 
I OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION 
Civil No. 974904859 DA 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Commissioner Susan Bradford 
COMES NOW the Respondent, Robert Nigohosian, by and through counsel, Ellen M. 
O'Hara, and moves this Court to alter or amend its judgment given at hearing before the 
Honorable William B. Bohling on Friday, October 25, 2002 and to enter the Amended FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DECREE OF DIVORCE as attached to this document. 
MEMORANDUM 
At the hearing on Friday, October 25, 2002, the Court heard argument on Respondent's 
Rule 60(a) and (b) Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and enter amended documents and 
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Petitioner's Objections to the Motion for Relief from Judgment. The Court decided to consider 
both Petitioner's Objections and Respondent's Objections. The Court considered Respondent's 
Motion for Relief from Judgment as the equivalent of Objections to a proposed Order. The Court 
ruled that it was fair to consider both Motions, if one or both were untimely filed. 
Counsel for Respondent supported the attached proposed amended documents by citing to 
the records where there were inaccuracies. Counsel for the Respondent also indicated that there 
were items in the original documents which were not part of the parties' stipulation and were 
never read into the Court's record. 
The inaccuracies or errors in language occur in the Findings of Fact [ and parallel places in 
the Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce] at these places: 
1. In the opening paragraph, the words "final and complete settlement" occur when in 
fact there were several issues omitted [ vehicles and a tax refund]. 
2. f 6 does not include Respondent's right to the elections mentioned in U.C.A. 30-3-
35, even though the record of the hearing indicates that this is part of the 
I 
stipoulation. I 
3. f7 does not reflect the court's own wording on the issue. 
4. 114 adds a statement that each party be awarded the personal property presently 
in their possession, even though that statement does not appear in the record, nor 
was it part of the parties' agreement. 
5. Tf 18 adds a second sentence even though that statement does not appear in the 
record, nor was it part of the parties' agreement. 
6. f 20 misstates the purpose for which the $500.00 was paid and adds language 
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concerning the Respondent's mother. The paragraph does not include the timing 
"on or before February 28, 2002" for payment of the debt. All of these items as 
read into the record appear in the amended documents attached hereto. 
7. Tf 25 was never part of the parties' agreement nor does it appear in the court 
record. 
8. Tf 26 fails to include language " or within three months after April 1, 2002" 
according to the court record. 
The Conclusions of Law |24 was added and was not part of the parties' agreement. The 
language does not appear in the court record. 
Counsel for the Petitioner did not challenge the accuracy of the statements in the revised 
documents as they appear in the official court transcript. Counsel for the Petitioner argued only 
that these items were matters of form and not substance, that the documents were not" perfect" 
and that the Court should leave them as entered because the divorce action had gone on for a long 
time. 
These errors are more than style: they affect Respondent's parent time [ since the elections 
must appear in the Court order], his responsibilities for debt and for a life insurance policy, for his 
rights to claim his son for tax purposes, for his right to seek redress for non-payment of the 
$500.00 and for his right to have the language of the order reflect the agreement as entered into 
the court record at the time of the hearing in Februaiy 2002. Given the acrimonious relationship 
between the parties, it is likely that there will be further litigation, so the language of the 
documents should fairly reflect the agreement. 
In its ruling, the Court characterized the Respondent's Motion to Set Aside as "buyer's 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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remorse". That is truly not the issue. At the beginning of the hearing, the Court decided to hear 
both Petitioner's Objections and Respondent's Motion equally, as if timely filed. If the Court 
considered Respondent's Motion as timely filed and if no objections were raised by Petitioner as 
to the accuracy of the changes as in the attached documents, Respondent should be entitled to 
have the documents enter as amended because these correctly reflect both the parties' agreement 
and the court's record. Having the amended documents enter would resolve almost all of the 
issues before 
WHEREFORE Respondent respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its decision and 
allowed the amended documents to enter. 
DATED this £ day of November , 2002. 
Mu^Q'L, 
Ellen M.O'Hara 
Attorney for the Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this _0 day of November,2002 I placed in the U.S. mail, first class postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to: 
Jennifer Lee 
Snow, Nuffer 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
341 S. Main, #303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
l&L. M. 0^ 
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Ellen M. O'Hara-7590 
Attorney for the Respondent 
211 East 300 South, Suite 215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-3968 
IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T , S A L T L A K E DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H 
M A R G A R E T NIGOHOSIAN, 
Petitioner, " 
vs. 
ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN, ) 
! ] 
Respondent. ) 
) R U L E 60 (a) and (b) MOTI ON FOR 
) R E L I E F F R O M J U D G M E N T , TO 
) SET A S I D E FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) C O N C L U S I O N S OF L A W A N D 
) D E C R E E O F D I V O R C E AND TO 
) E N T E R A M E N D E D D O C U M E N T S 
) A N D M E M O R A N D U M IN SUPPORT 
) O F M O T I O N 
I Civil No . 974904859 DA 
i Judge Wil l iam B. Bo hling 
I Commiss ioner Susan Bradford 
COMES N O W the Respondent, Robert Nigohosian, by and through counsel, Ellen M. 
O'Hara, and moves this Court for relief from judgment and to set aside the F I N D I N G S OF F A C T 
A N D C O N C L U S I O N S O F L A W and the D E C R E E O F D I V O R C E entered on or about June 20 ,2002 in 
this action and to enter the attached Amended F I N D I N G S OF F A C T A N D C O N C L U S I O N S OF L A W 
and D E C R E E O F D I V O R C E as attached to this document. 
MEMORANDUM 
There are items in the original FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and the 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE entered on or about June 20, 2002 which were not part of the parties' 
Stipulations as entered by the Court. The Respondent requests that the Court correct these errors 
by entering the attached amended documents under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court may do so under Rule 60 (a) because the Court assumed that the 
documents correctly reflected what occurred in Court. The Court may correct these errors as of a 
clerical nature. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co. 299 P.2d 827 (Utah 1956). 
In the alternative, Respondent requests that the Court set aside the original documents as 
entered by the Court and enter the amended documents based on Rule 60(b) (1) and (6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 11 day of July , 2002. 
Ellen M. O'Hara 
Attorney for the Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this / 7 day of July,2002 I placed in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to: 
Margaret Nigohosian 
Petitioner 
7026 South Sunburst Cir. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
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\. . 
JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196 
McINTYRE Sc GOLDEN, L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
3838 South West Temple, Suite 3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 266-3399 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN, 
Respondent. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECREE OF 
DIVORCE 
Civil No. 974904859DA 
Honorable William B. Bohling 
Commissioner Susan Bradford 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, 
please take notice that the Decree of Divorce was entered on June 
20, 2002. ^ 
Dated thi s C7~/ ' day o ., 2002 
cINTYRE Sc GOLDEN, L.C. 
<7AMEsN^. McINTYRE 
Attorneys, for Petitioner 
I:\Cfients\Nigohosian\Noticc of Entry of Decree of Divorce, wpd 
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I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ( 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE * 
Ellen O'Hara 
to the following on this ^ f day of \=J/U^V^Ji—- , 2002. ' 
i 
i 
i 
Attorney at Law ^ 
211 East 300 South, Suite 215 i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2488 ' ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
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